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Introduction
[1]
We are in the midst of a digital revolution. In this “Age of Peer
Production,” armies of amateur participants demand the freedom to rip, remix,
and share their own digital culture.1 Aided by the newest iteration of file sharing
networks, digital media users now have the option to retreat underground, by
using secure, private, and anonymous file sharing networks, to share freely and
breathe new life into digital media.2 These underground networks, collectively
termed “the Darknet[,] will grow in scope, resilience, and effectiveness in direct
proportion to [increasing] digital restrictions the public finds untenable.”3 The
Darknet has been called the public’s great equalizing force in the digital
millennium, because it will serve as “a counterbalancing force and bulwark to
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1

See Chris Anderson, People Power, WIRED, July 2006, available at http://www.wired.com/
wired/archive/14.07/people html (last visited May 20, 2010).
2

See, e.g., About GNUnet, http://www.gnunet.org (last visited May 20, 2010).
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J.D. Lasica, DARKNET: HOLLYWOOD’S WAR AGAINST THE DIGITAL GENERATION 264 (John
Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2005).
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defend digital liberties” against forces lobbying for stronger copyrights and
increased technological controls.4
[2]
This article proposes a digital use exception to existing copyright law to
provide adequate compensation to authors while promoting technological
innovation, and the creation and dissemination of new works. Although seemingly
counterintuitive, content producers, publishers, and distributors wishing to profit
from their creations must relinquish their control over digital media in order to
survive the Darknet era. Absent a government-granted monopoly, free market
forces will provide adequate incentives to producers to create quality works, and
an efficient dissemination infrastructure will evolve.
[3]
Part I examines the prospect that, due to the Darknet, it is virtually
impossible to control digital copying. Peer production is increasing and darknets
are becoming more prevalent. Liability rules, stringent copyrights, and
technological protection measures stifle innovation, smother creation, and force
consumers further underground into darknets. The Darknet poses a particular
threat because it is impossible to track or proscribe user behavior. Further, the
presence of the Darknet will render technological protection measures
unenforceable, or at least impracticable, as a solution for digital copyright
management. Part II introduces a digital use exception for copyright to deter
development of the Darknet. The proposed copyright shelter is the solution most
closely aligned with the goals of copyright, and a monopoly is no longer
necessary or practical to accomplish those goals in the digital realm. Part III
explores methods by which content creators, publishers, and distributors can
profit under this new rule. Absent copyrights for digital works, service providers
will capitalize on alternative business methods and data mining. Driven by
necessity, they will commission the production of new works.
I. THE RISE OF THE DARKNET CHALLENGES DIGITAL COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT
A. Peer Production and Distributed Networking
1. Digital Content Consumers Become Producers
[4]
Internet users no longer passively consume media. Today’s consumers
actively participate, communicate, collaborate, and create a considerable amount

4

Id.
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of amateur content (often referred to as user-generated content or UGC).5 This
new breed of producer-consumers, sometimes termed “prosumers,” embodies
democratic culture.6 The digital revolution promises prosumers freedom to
interact with media on their own terms.7 Not only do they choose what to watch,
read, hear, or create, they dictate when, where, how, and with whom they will do
so.8
[5]
Amateur production on the Internet is growing in volume and
sophistication9 with prosumers expressing themselves through blogs, videos,
photos, music (original scores, mash-ups and remixes), personalized web pages,
and software applications.10 Web 2.0, the newest generation of Internet
development, provides the technology that facilitates prosumer participation:
wikis, podcasting, news fora, social networking sites, hosting services, and search
engines.11 Peer-to-peer (P2P) networking is arguably the most controversial of
these technologies. Peer-to-peer networking is a natural companion to peer
production because it provides an efficient distribution vehicle for digital media
and allows near-perfect access to content.12 Since users communicate directly and

5

See, e.g., Press Release, Principles for User Generated Content Services, Internet and Media
Industry Leaders Unveil Principles to Foster Online Innovation While Protecting Copyrights (Oct.
18, 2007), available at http://www.ugcprinciples.com/press_release html (last visited May 20,
2010).
6

ALVIN TOFFLER, THE THIRD WAVE 283 (William Morrow & Company 1980) (coining the term
“prosumers”).
7

See id.

8

See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID ECONOMY
44 (Penguin Press 2008).
9

Johan A. Pouwelse et al., Pirates and Samaritans: a Decade of Measurements on Peer
Production and Their Implications for Net Neutrality and Copyright, 32 TELECOMMS. POL’Y 701,
711 (2008) (detailing Dutch scientists’ findings from research that tracked P2P networking for ten
years).
10

See, e.g., YouTube Home Page, http://www.youtube.com (last visited May 20, 2010);
WordPress Home Page, http://wordpress.com (last visited May 20, 2010).

11

See Claudia K. Grinnell, From Consumer to Prosumer to Produser: Who Keeps Shifting My
Paradigm? (We Do!), 21 PUB. CULTURE 577, 595 (2009).
12

Pouwelse et al., supra note 9, at 702.
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contribute both content and hardware resources, P2P replaces the traditional,
central-server Internet model as the primary vehicle for content distribution.13
2. Distributed Networking Technology
[6]
Peer-to-peer distribution technology differs from traditional Internet
functioning by permitting computers to share information directly with other
computers without the need for a central storage server.14 Previously, computers
connected to the Internet communicated with each other through servers using
standard Protocol guidelines.15 Internet Protocol (IP) addresses that identify each
computer on the Internet can be converted to recognizable names (e.g.,
www.spacebook.com).16 Typically, media files and other content are stored on
central servers (hosts) in a traditional client/server relationship.17 In that system,
client (user) computers can only access information on servers through websites
using the Internet, and clients cannot exchange files directly with other client
computers.18 In contrast, a P2P network permits a computer connected to the
Internet to identify itself as both a client and a server, thereby enabling the
computer to communicate directly with any other computer on the Internet to
exchange files.19 All types of P2P network models fall within the classification of
distributed networks because no central server stores the files.20
[7]
In a distributed network, every computer acts as a host, and each user can
introduce content to the network by storing files on their computer and making

13

Id.

14

Stephanos Androutsellis-Theotokis & Diomidis Spinellis, A Survey of Peer-to-Peer Content
Distribution Technologies, 36 ACM COMPUTING SURVEYS 335, 335-36 (2004).
15

Grinnell, supra note 11, at 578.

16

BILL AVERY, SAN LUIS OBISPO PC USERS GROUP: GENERAL MEETING 2 (2002),
http://www.slobytes.org/newsletter/nl1202.pdf.
17

David Barkai, An Introduction to Peer-to-Peer Computing, INTEL DEVELOPER MAG., Feb. 2000,
at 1, 3.
18

Id.

19

Id.

20

Androutsellis-Theotokis, supra note 14, at 337.
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those files available to others on the network.21 The content available at any given
moment depends on the contemporaneous files on the network users’
computers.22 A software application is required to establish a P2P network
connection.23 Instead of locating a website address, as is used on client/server
networks, a P2P program retrieves the IP addresses of other available users and
establishes a direct connection between two or more computers.24 The software
then allows the users to exchange files, chat, or engage in other activities directly
between the networked computers.25
[8]
Although there are several types of P2P architectural designs, all
distributed networks have the same infrastructure requirements:
(1) facilities for injecting new content into the [network] (input);
(2) a distribution network that carries copies of content to users
(transmission); (3) ubiquitous rendering devices, which allow users
to consume [content] (output); (4) a search mechanism to enable
users to find objects (database); (5) storage that allows the
[network] to retain [content] for extended periods of time.
Functionally, this is mostly a caching mechanism that reduces the
load and exposure of nodes that inject [objects].26
Effective P2P platforms demonstrate the following additional features: “(1) The
ability to distinguish between good and bad contributions; (2) A regulation
mechanism for computer resources; (3) Effective mechanisms for group

21

See James Cope, QuickStudy: Peer-to-Peer Network, COMPUTER WORLD, Apr. 8, 2002,
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/69883/Peer_to_Peer_Network.
22

See id.

23

See generally Microsoft Support, How to Set Up a TCP/IP Peer-to-Peer Network Connection,
http://support.microsoft.com/kb/150575 (last visited May 20, 2010).

24

See id.

25

Aric Jacover, Note, I Want My MP3! Creating a Legal and Practical Scheme to Combat
Copyright Infringement on Peer-to-Peer Internet Applications, 90 GEO. L.J. 2207, 2208 (2002).

26

PETER BIDDLE ET AL., THE DARKNET AND THE FUTURE OF CONTENT DISTRIBUTION 2 (2002),
http://msl1.mit.edu/ESD10/docs/darknet5.pdf. The aforementioned source is a paper presented by
Microsoft computer security experts at a 2002 ACM Workshop on Digital Rights Management.
ACMSiggraph Public Policy Program, http://www.siggraph.org/pub-policy/CGColumn-022003.html (last visited May 20, 2010).
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communication; [and] (4) A sense of community.”27 These features act as network
regulators to ensure user contribution, resource management, communication, and
longevity.28
3. Distributed Networks Promote Progress More
Effectively Than Client/Server Networks
a. Optimal Means of Digital Content Distribution
[9]
Public distributed networks are an immensely valuable tool for the
creation and dissemination of digital creative works. They are the economically
and technologically optimal vehicles for digital content distribution. Distributed
networks are economically efficient because users donate their own (often idle)
computing resources29 to facilitate distribution, essentially providing free
bandwidth, storage space, and computing power.30 Storage and distribution costs
shift to users and are spread amongst all users in the network.31 Unlike traditional
client/server networks, which have fixed capacities, distributed networks are
scalable—capable of increasing their performance as they grow in physical size.32
As users provide the system infrastructure, when demand on the system increases
with the addition of new users and content, the total capacity of the system also
increases.33 Distributed networks are less vulnerable to bandwidth constraints than
traditional client/server models, where users connect through a single website or
server.34 Sharing resources across a network is more stable and reliable than
traditional client/server distribution because a breach or failure in one sector will

27

Pouwelse et al., supra note 9, at 704.

28

Id.

29

See Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Without Restricting
Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1382 (2004).
30

See Niva Elkin-Koren, Making Technology Visible: Liability of Internet Service Providers for
Peer-to-Peer Traffic, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 15, 22 (2006).
31

Id.

32

Id. at 21.

33

Id.

34

See Lemley & Reese, supra note 29, at 1381-82.
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not sabotage the whole system.35 Since connections between users are direct,
distributed networks deliver content more quickly and efficiently than traditional
models.36 Additionally, transmitting information directly between users avoids the
bottleneck effect of traditional client/server transmission.37 Peer-to-peer network
models equipped with a central index can quickly locate files and
comprehensively search through all resources on the network.38 Furthermore,
users benefit from locating and using works for free, and the low cost of
distributed networking may increase the public’s access to hard-to-find, out of
print, or orphaned works that have been made available digitally.39
b. Increase the Volume and Quality of Creative Works
[10] In addition to making all works more accessible, P2P networking
increases the breadth and depth of the public’s collective knowledge by providing
a greater volume and variety of new creative works. Just as users donate
computing resources on P2P networks, many consumers also volunteer their
creative resources. As reproduction, storage, and distribution become cheaper,
more prosumers contribute to the collective directory. The blossom of peer
production results in an increased output of new works.
[11] Peer-to-peer networks also improve the quality of publicly available
goods. Improvements in commercial technology enable prosumers to easily and
quickly generate more sophisticated and innovative works.40 In addition, P2P
networks facilitate collaboration,41 which leads to better quality. Accordingly,
distributed networks are frequently employed on university campuses and in

35

See id.

36

See id.

37

See Elkin-Koren, supra note 30, at 17.

38

See id. at 20.

39

See id. at 69-70.

40

Derek E. Baumbauer, Faulty Math: The Economics of Legalizing the Grey Album, 59 ALA. L.
REV. 345, 352 (2008).
41

See Jamie Oberdick, Best Uses for LionShare, Penn State’s Peer-to-Peer Academic
Collaboration Tool, Nov. 30, 2006, http://www.psu.edu/dept/itscss/news/nlfa06/lionshare.html.
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scientific communities to lower research costs, share ideas and information, and
collaborate with like-minded peers.42
[12] For instance, LionShare is a P2P network designed to support the
discovery and reuse of educational content between multiple academic
institutions.43 As media files are increasing in size, LionShare makes it easier for
professors and students to transfer those files to one another.44 The multiuser
group chat function facilitates collaboration between several academic players
located at various institutions.45 To deter unauthorized sharing of protected
materials, this system was specifically designed such that users are not
anonymous.46
[13] Peer-to-peer networks provide a low cost alternative to traditional
marketing and advertising for creative content.47 “Making a song available for
download to generate hype about a new release takes seconds, and relying on
peer-to-peer sharing to disseminate the song costs the music industry very
little.”48 This low cost of promotion minimizes financial risks in business
planning.49 Lower risks and reduced distribution costs make it economically
feasible to produce and disseminate new types of marginal media that might
attract only a small group of fans.50 Thus, distributed networking provides new
opportunities for innovation as many niche markets might flourish with the

42

See id.

43

See id.

44

See id.

45

See id.

46

See id.

47

Baumbauer, supra note 40, at 351.

48

Meghan Douherty, Note, Voluntary Collective Licensing: The Solution to the Music Industry’s
File Sharing Crisis?, 13 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 405, 408 (2006).
49

See id.

50

Elkin-Koren, supra note 30, at 69-70.

8

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XVI, Issue 4

addition of groups previously considered too small or obscure to justify offering
them a customized product.51
c. Consumer Freedom and Control Protects First Amendment Rights
[14] Peer-to-peer networks facilitate bottom-up participation that enriches the
democratic process.52 Enhanced peer production and increased availability of
marginal works protect the interests of minority or unpopular political factions.53
Users connect directly to each other; removing intermediaries from the
communication process.54 The lack of central control makes distributed networks
less vulnerable to censorship and protects citizens’ rights to free speech, press,
and assembly. 55
[15] Moreover, distributed networks are inherently responsive to content
demands. The fact that consumers are also suppliers means that if a large number
of people want to download a particular work, then a large number of people are
likely to make that work available for upload as well. Since users are free to make
their own choices about what content to consume, P2P networking shifts control
to users to decide what content to make available and when to make it available.56
Peer-to-peer networking also allows this decision-making process to operate on a
large scale.57 There is less risk that unpopular or marginal works will be scarce
since digital reproduction costs very little, and digital networking eliminates the
need for publishers to print additional copies or make guesses regarding the
popularity of works (to divvy up server storage space and marketing dollars).58

51

See Baumbauer, supra note 40, at 352 (arguing that open source software and other applications
where “users can tailor works to suit their needs” are particularly beneficial to users who
constitute a “group too small or obscure for the original author to see any benefit in offering them
a customized product.”).

52

Elkin-Koren, supra note 30, at 70.

53

Id.

54

Id. at 19-20.

55

Id. at 23; see U.S. CONST. amend. I.

56

Elkin-Koren, supra note 30, at 69.

57

Id.

58

Id. at 69-70.
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[16] Additionally, many P2P software application systems are written using
open source code.59 Open architecture facilitates innovation by non-industry or
fringe players that might have different interests and incentives from the industry
standard.60 This encourages quality through competition by allowing the
development of subversive technologies that can challenge the existing
technological paradigm.61
B. Liability Rules Inhibit Innovation in the
Development of P2P Network Design
1. Early P2P Technology: Centralized Networks
[17] Generally, P2P networks are either centralized or decentralized.62
Centralized models, such as Napster, utilize a central server system that facilitates
users’ activities in the network.63 Files are stored and distributed by means of
users’ own computers, not on the server.64 The server’s function is to establish
connections between users and facilitate user-initiated file searches, using (and
storing) a directory of available file names and users’ IP addresses.65 Users can
search the directory for files available on all host users’ computers.66 Then, the
P2P software establishes a connection between those two users, who transfer the
file directly between their computers.67
[18] The centralized model is preferred because the directory and central index
locate files quickly and efficiently.68 Since users must access the system through a
59

See Baumbauer, supra note 40, at 382-83.

60

Elkin-Koren, supra note 30, at 70.

61

Id.

62

See id.

63

Id. at 20.

64

Id. at 17.

65

Id. at 19-20.

66

Id. at 20.

67

Id. at 19-20.

68

See Jacover, supra note 25, at 2217.
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central point, one can disable the entire system by shutting down the server, thus,
providing considerable control over users.69 Most importantly, users must register
with the system (to be located and connected), so the service provider knows the
identity of each user, as well as what he is downloading.70
[19] In the 1990s, the propagation of digital technologies provoked the media
content industry to lobby Congress for stronger copyright protection.71 When it’s
lobbying proved successful, the media content industry implemented an
aggressive litigation strategy designed to enforce the new rules.72 Initially, the
content industry targeted commercial entities for contributory and vicarious
infringement because a single lawsuit could shut down the central server and
eliminate an entire dissemination mechanism.73
[20] Unfortunately, the same features of the centralized model that make it
efficient also render its purveyors more susceptible to vicarious liability for users’
copyright infringement. In 2001, a Ninth Circuit court held Napster, a P2P service
provider, potentially liable for contributory and vicarious copyright
infringement.74 The court cited Napster’s ability to control user behavior through
their central search index as a primary rationale.75 Although the court ordered
69

See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1041 (C.D.
Cal. 2003).

70

A&M Recs., Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001).

71

See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) (extending copyright terms in the United
States by 20 years); Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006) (outlawing the
act of circumventing technological measures that effectively control access to a work); No
Electronic Theft (NET) Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§
101, 506-07, 18 U.S.C. §§ 994, 2319-20, 28 U.S.C. § 1498) (applying criminal penalties to
copyright infringement even when no direct financial benefit was received by the infringer).

72

LESSIG, supra note 8, at 39.

73

Lemley & Reese, supra note 29, at 1377.

74

A&M Recs., 239 F.3d at 1024.

75

Id. at 1022-24. The court found Napster liable for contributory infringement because its services
were designed to enable users to locate and download music files. Id. at 1024. The court reasoned
that Napster materially contributed to its users’ infringement since evidence showed Napster had
actual knowledge of infringing activity on the network but failed to purge the system. Id. at 1022.
Additionally, the court found Napster vicariously liable for its users’ infringing activities because
the central index provided Napster with the right and ability to supervise its users. Id. at 1024. The
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Napster to prevent sharing of particular files on its system and exercise control
over users identified as infringers, the company was unable to create a filtering
mechanism sufficiently accurate to meet its obligation with the court. Ultimately,
Napster filed for bankruptcy.76 While Napster’s demise might have signaled the
end of unauthorized file sharing across its network, it cast a shadow on the
socially beneficial, legitimate uses for centralized networks.
2. Second Generation Technology:
Decentralized (Fully Distributed) Networks
[21] The Napster ruling signaled the demise of centralized networks and
spurred a shift to less efficient, decentralized networks that are detrimental to
social welfare.77 One indication that liability rules influence product design is that
architects redesigned networks to minimize the risk of being sued, often at the
expense of social welfare.78 Scholars have noted that P2P networks fall prey to
increased legal pressure to redesign their networks to inhibit sharing.79 This
evolution of inferior technology poses significant threats to copyright
enforcement on the Internet by making it harder to track and identify
infringement.
[22] As a consequence of the Napster ruling, subsequent P2P network
operators, wanting to avoid liability for user-initiated sharing, sought to
decentralize their systems.80 Second generation technology connects users directly

court believed that Napster could locate infringing material listed on its central search indices and
had the right to terminate users’ access to the system. Id. Although Napster’s service was free to
users, the unauthorized materials increased traffic and advertising revenue. Id. at 1023.
76

See Vickie L. Feeman et al., Revenge of the Record Industry Association of America: The Rise
and Fall of Napster, 9 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 35, 53 (2002); see also Evan Hansen & Lisa M.
Bowman, Court: Napster Filters Must Be Foolproof, CNET NEWS, July 12, 2001,
http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-6549898 html (last visited May 20, 2010).
77

See RAMEEZ RAHMAN ET AL., REVISITING SOCIAL WELFARE IN P2P, DELFT UNIVERSITY OF
TECHNOLOGY PARALLEL AND DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS REPORT SERIES
(2009),
http://pds.twi.tudelft nl/reports/2009/PDS-2009-003.pdf.
78

See Michael Baram, Liability and Its Influence on Designing for Product and Process Safety, 45
SAFETY SCI. 11, 13 (2007) (discussing how tort product liability law influences product design).
79

Elkin-Koren, supra note 30, at 60.

80

See Lemley & Reese, supra note 29, at 1355-65.
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to each other without routing information through a single central server (like
centralized models).81 In contrast to centralized models, the new decentralized
models do not employ a directory or centralized index to route searches.82 Further,
they cannot store a search index, identify users, or directly facilitate
connections.83 Semi-distributed hybrid systems, such as the FastTrack protocol
used by Grokster, abandon the central index but randomly (and unbeknownst to
the user) assign computers in the system to operate as supernodes—centralized
connection points that index files and handle search requests.84 These connections
speed searching and processing functions and avoid bottlenecking.
[23] Rather than utilize supernodes, fully decentralized models, such as
Gnutella, route searches serially through any available users on the network.85
Both models create communities by pooling the IP addresses of users connected
to the Internet, enabling a branching network that allows users to connect with
each other directly.86 After entering the network, a user can search for files
through all the computers to which he is connected, communicate, and trade files
with other users, “without using any central servers or intermediaries.”87 Unlike
FastTrack, Gnutella further distances itself from liability because “it is an open
[source] protocol, and anyone can write a Gnutella client application,” meaning
there is no single operator to hold liable.88
[24] Decentralized systems are generally less efficient than networks with a
central index because the branching system design slows searches and file
exchanges.89 Moreover, service providers of decentralized systems have less
81

BIDDLE ET AL., supra note 26, at 6.

82

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayers Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 920 (2005).

83

Id.

84

Id. at 921.

85

The original Gnutella software application is no longer in circulation but similar open source
versions
may
be
available.
See
Marshall
Brain,
How
Gnutella
Works,
http://computer howstuffworks.com/file-sharing2 htm (last visited May 20, 2010).
86

Jacover, supra note 25, at 2216.

87

See id. at 2215–17.

88

BIDDLE ET AL., supra note 26, at 6.

89

Jacover, supra note 25, at 2217.
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control over users. Without a central server, a provider has little or no ability to
supervise infringing activity and cannot remove infringing titles or infringing
users from the system.90 Decentralized systems are also more difficult to shut
down because there is no central access point.91 Further, as many decentralized
systems use open source protocols, shutting down part of the system is ineffective
because savvy users can adapt copies of the program’s code to keep the system
running.92
[25] The scattered design of decentralized systems also encourages free riding
by users who wish to download without uploading. Such behavior compromises
the system’s effectiveness because storage costs are not dissipated evenly
amongst users. Protocols, such as BitTorrent, were developed to stabilize
contribution levels on P2P networks.93 These services make collaboration
mandatory because they restrict users’ content download rates based on the value
of the users’ current contributions.94
[26] Early versions of BitTorrent required an intermediary “tracker” service to
perform the search function and aggregate torrent files to enable uploading and
downloading.95 The trackers “maintain[ed] a log [detailing] which users . . .
download[ed] the file and where the file and its fragments reside[d].”96 The logs
were instrumental in lawsuits against trackers by “identifying infringers who
downloaded and shared copyrighted material.”97
[27] After being shut down and redesigned in the face of litigation threats,98
subsequent versions of BitTorrent eliminated the need for trackers.99 “With no

90

Id. at 2240.

91

See id. at 2217, 2240.

92

See id. at 2245.

93

See Pouwelse et al., supra note 9, at 705.

94

Id.; see also BIDDLE ET AL., supra note 26, at 6.

95

Elkin-Koren, supra note 30, at 59.

96

Id.

97

Id. at 59-60.

98

SuprNova, once the largest BitTorrent tracker service was forced to shut down following the
launch of the Motion Picture Association of America’s (MPAA) campaign against unauthorized
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central features, the new design makes it more difficult for copyright holders to
track and shut down illegal file sharing.”100 But shutting down efficient
distribution services and “forc[ing society] to rely on a less-efficient mechanism
for disseminating digital content . . . represents a cost to society.”101
3. The Evolution of the Darknet
[28] Created by developers responding to threats of litigation, decentralized
P2P technology shifted control away from the service provider, making it more
difficult to track user behavior. Those P2P networks retain one key feature: users
of Gnutella and other BitTorrent-type networks “are not anonymous.”102 By
permitting the determination of server endpoints, decentralized networks reveal
the IP address and affiliation of file sharing peers.103 Although, activity and users

file sharing. John Borland, BitTorrent File-Swapping Networks Face Crisis, CNET NEWS, Dec.
20,
2004,
http://news.cnet.com/BitTorrent-file-swapping-networks-face-crisis/2100-1025_35498326.html; see also John Borland, MPAA Targets Core BitTorrent, eDonkey User, CNET
NEWS, Dec. 14, 2004, http://news.cnet.com/MPAA-targets-core-BitTorrent%2C-eDonkeyusers/2100-1025_3-5490804.html. Many users of the SuprNova BitTorrent service retreated back
to the Gnutella protocol on Grokster until the Court forced it to close in 2005. Metro-GoldwynMayers Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 941 (2005) (holding Grokster liable for
users’ infringing behavior since they distributed their product with the intention of inducing
infringement and then reaped the commercial benefits). Remaining providers of file sharing
software seek refuge under the Court’s holding in Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., which found that the distribution of copying equipment does not constitute contributory
infringement if it is capable of substantial non-infringing uses. 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
Organizations that continue to distribute file sharing software actively take steps to avoid Grokster
liability. For instance, LimeWire, whose software runs on Gnutella-type protocol, requires that
users agree not to infringe copyright. LimeWire, End User License Agreement,
http://www.limewire.com/legal/eula (last visited May 20, 2010). LimeWire also makes affirmative
efforts to educate users about unauthorized file sharing. LimeWire, Using P2P Software Safely,
http://www.limewire.com/legal/safety (last visited May 20, 2010).
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on public P2P networks are difficult to track, it is not impossible.104 Thus, it is
possible to detect infringing behavior and identify defendants for litigation.
Further, decentralized networks are not private since peers communicate with
everybody on the network.105
[29] The final steps in the P2P evolution process came when, after targeting
commercial entities (such as Napster) with their steadfast litigation, the content
industry shifted its attention to ordinary citizens.106 The Recording Industry
Association of America (RIAA) has sued over fifteen thousand individuals
alleging copyright infringement.107 To escape liability, consumers demanded that
P2P developers follow their own precedent and improve distributed networks to
shield users from liability by providing users with anonymity, privacy, and
increased security control.108 These newest versions of distributed networks,
known as darknets, pose a serious threat to copyright enforcement on the Internet
by concealing user behavior from detection.
C. The Darknet
[30] Generally, the Darknet refers to the underground Internet.109 In November
2002, four senior Microsoft security engineers coined the term “Darknet” in an
influential paper entitled The Darknet and the Future of Content Distribution.110
In a post-Napster, pre-Gnutella environment, the engineers defined darknets
broadly as “a collection of networks and technologies used to share digital
content.”111 Since then, the term has infiltrated the mainstream media and been
used to refer to a variety of clandestine Internet activities and technologies. From
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Posting of RIAA Watcher to RIAA Watch, http://sharenomore.blogspot.com (June 16, 2006,
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See MIKA SUVANTO, PRIVACY IN PEER-TO-PEER NETWORKS, 3 (2010) http://www.tml.tkk.fi/
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small file sharing networks to elite and exclusive cyber clubs,112 to databases
unreachable by cyber robots,113 to avenues for cybercrime and Internet
terrorism,114 the Darknet evokes increasingly nebulous and threatening activities.
[31] More recently, the term is used to differentiate private, anonymous
distributed networks from their public predecessors.115 In his groundbreaking
legal work regarding darknets, Fred von Lohmann incorporated the element of
privacy, defining the Darknet as “[t]he collection of networks and other
technologies that enable people to illegally share copyrighted digital files with
little or no fear of detection.”116 In his 2005 book, Darknet: Hollywood’s War
Against the Digital Generation, Darknet expert J.D. Lasica emphasized that
darknets can be used for illegitimate activities.117 Lascia defined darknets as
“networks of people who rely on closed-off social spaces—safe havens in both
virtual and real worlds where there is little or no fear of detection—to share
copyrighted digital material with others or to escape the restrictions on digital
media imposed by entertainment companies.”118 Lasica described the Darknet
112

Gary Rivlin, 2003: The 3rd Annual Year in Ideas; Darknets, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2003,
available at http://www nytimes.com/2003/12/14/magazine/2003-the-3rd-annual-year-in-ideasdarknets html?sec=technology&spon= (describing darknets as private, invitation-only cyberclubs
or gated communities requiring an access code to enter).
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Webopedia.com, Sneakernet, http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/S/sneakernet html (last visited
May 20, 2010). As technology evolved, so did the methods by which users sought to share media.
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Fred von Lohmann, Measuring the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Against the Darknet:
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635, 637 n.15 (2004) (citing The Word Spy, http://www.wordspy.com/words/darknet.asp (last
visited May 20, 2010)). Fred von Lohmann is senior staff attorney at the Electronic Frontier
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117

LASICA, supra note 4, at 45

118

LASICA, supra note 4, at 45. Lasica describes many darknets including:

17

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XVI, Issue 4

space as a digital media mega-mart with a wild-west mentality, a “vast, gathering,
lawless economy of shared music, movies, television shows, games, software, and
porn—a one-touch jukebox that would rival the products and services of the
entertainment companies.”119
[32] Users often refer to darknets for file sharing as friend-to-friend (F2F)
networks, because direct connections are only established between trusted
friends.120 But the term “Darknet” can also be used to describe any private file
sharing network.121 For the sake of clarity, this article will differentiate between
these terms. The term “darknet” will refer to a decentralized distributed network
(lacking a central index) that incorporates privacy, security (encryption), and user
anonymity features, with the primary purpose of sharing information with trusted
members. When capitalized, “Darknet” will refer to those networks collectively.
[33] The goal of darknets is to create a closed network to communicate
securely in a manner that defies detection or penetration by governments or
corporations.122 A user can download, upload, and inject content anonymously,
meaning an outsider cannot sufficiently identify a user.123 Improvements in
privacy and security permit increased anonymity, and the lack of a public entry

[T]he millions of users trading files in the shady regions of Usenet and Internet
Relay Chat; students who send songs and TV shows to each other using instant
messaging services from AOL, Yahoo, and Microsoft; city streets and college
campuses where people copy, burn, and share physical media like CDs; and the
new breed of encrypted dark networks like Freenet . . . .
Id.
119

Id.
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PRIVATE PEER-TO-PEER NETWORKS 2 (2007), available at http://www.cs.st-andrews.ac.uk/
~saleem/papers/2007/space2007/space2007-rb2007.pdf.
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See Bradley Mitchell, About.com: Wireless/Networking, http://compnetworking.about.com/od/
p2ppeertopeer/g/bldef_darknet.htm?p=1 (last visited May 20, 2010).
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See John Markoff, File Sharers Anonymous: Building a Net That’s Private, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
1, 2005, available at http://query nytimes.com/gst/fullpage html?res=9503E4DE1E3FF932A3575
BC0A9639C8B63 (last visited May 20, 2010).
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point to the network makes it difficult or impossible for outsiders to discover what
users share on darknets.124
1. The Immediate Future of the Darknet
[34] Darknet technology has been in development for several years and is
currently on the verge of becoming a commercially feasible alternative to
traditional P2P networks.125 Although early darknets faced some technological
challenges that made them inefficient and difficult to use, recent improvements
have propelled darknets into the general marketplace.126 Viable darknet models
were recently released for commercial use, and scholars have predicted that
darknets will be ready for mass usage in 2010.127 Widespread use of darknets will
frustrate efforts to detect and track illegal file sharing, making enforcement of
copyrights on the Internet difficult or impossible.
a. Improvements in Security and Privacy
[35] Freenet is one of the earliest examples of a darknet.128 The Freenet Project
produced a darknet in 2000, but it was slow, difficult to use, and offered little
content.129 Full anonymity posed a challenge as it cost extra bandwidth and was
difficult to combine with enforcement of resource contributions.130 Irish
programmer Ian Clarke, who introduced the Freenet software, vehemently
asserted that the primary goal of his darknet was to protect political opponents of
repressive regimes.131 Freenet’s website claimed that, without anonymity, there
can never be true freedom of speech, and without decentralization, the network
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2005.
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will be vulnerable to attack.132 Freenet might inhibit censorship by proscribing
governments and corporations from restricting the flow of digital information.133
It is worth noting that Clarke is open about his disdain for copyright laws and
asserts that his technology would produce a world in which users may share all
information freely.134 Clarke acknowledges that the software would surely be
used to circumvent copyright restrictions, adding: ‘‘It’s an inevitable consequence
of our design.’’135
[36] A major development in the current version of Freenet is scalability—the
software is capable of supporting millions of users using an application of smallworld network theory.136 To preserve user anonymity, Freenet increased network
security by allowing users to limit which other peers they communicate with, in
contrast to the typical ‘promiscuous’ approach of classic P2P networks, in which
the connection between users is automatic.137 Freenet not only prevents outsiders
from finding out what users are doing, but it also makes it extremely difficult for
adversaries to know a user is running a Freenet node138 or to discover the identity
of anyone publishing or downloading content.139
b. Improvements in User Interface Design and Mass Distribution
[37] While earlier versions were reserved for sophisticated users, improved
user interface design makes the Darknet accessible to the average consumer. The
most recent version of a darknet is LimeWire’s Upgrade 5.1 (LW5),140 which
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enables users to create private networks for file sharing.141 The user-friendly
technology offers users a heightened level of control by allowing them to easily
designate which files or classes of files they wish to share (on a user-by-user and
file-by-file and basis).142 The software enables users to connect directly to their
contacts located on any Jabber server, such as GMail or LiveJournal, and users
retain complete control over the people with whom they share content.143
LimeWire 5.1’s default setting does not share documents with its public P2P
network and does not share information with parties outside of a user’s network,
rendering activity on users’ networks difficult or impossible to detect.144 The
mainstream circulation of Darknets could make it more difficult for rights-holders
to detect infringing activity on a mass scale.145
[38] Although other, less popular services exist for group file sharing, such as
Dropbox and RapidShare, the LW5 release is significant because it offers privacy
and propels the Darknet into mainstream use.146 Prior darknets were generally
limited to the tech savvy, but LW5 is easily distributed to LimeWire’s millions of
existing customers as an upgrade and is accessible even to those with limited
technical skills and no familiarity with current Darknet systems.147 Perhaps the

LimeWire 5.1 was made public for Windows, Mac and Linux); see Live from CES 2009:
Competing with Free, http://blog.copyrightalliance.org/2009/01/live-from-ces-2009-competingwith-free (Jan. 7, 2009, 20:03 EST) (stating that the release of LW5 was coupled with an
announcement that LimeWire would operate a licensed retail operation on an advertising-based
revenue model and offer consumers the option to purchase authorized copies of files). Similar to
Clarke’s aggressive Freenet free-speech campaign, this strategy is presumably to avoid Grokster
infringement liability. LimeWire also discussed a plan to sell search term keywords and share
advertising revenue. Id. By participating, copyright owners are arguably authorizing file trading
without any compensation directly linked to the work. Id.
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most enticing feature for users is that LW5 lets them privately share files of any
size for free by transfering content directly from computer to computer.148 This
abrogates the traditional file size limitations of e-mail and other online file
sending services.149
c. Improvements in Infrastructure, Interconnectivity and Network Effects
[39] As the U.S. telecommunications industry continues to grow, it will
provide the infrastructure to support the spread of darknets. Peer-to-peer
technology has been proven to be commercially popular, and Darknet technology
will naturally follow suit. In 2006, P2P traffic accounted for two-thirds of all
Internet traffic.150 This is not surprising, considering the efficiency and efficacy of
P2P technology for distribution of content. The rapid build-out of consumer
broadband, the dropping price of storage, and the fact that personal computers are
effectively establishing themselves as centers of home-entertainment will fuel the
spread of darknets.151 The rising popularity of collaborative websites and sharing
platforms (such as YouTube) will create more shared content and better
mechanisms to filter through that content. The Darknet will adopt some of these
social networking and filtering mechanisms in order to improve network
performance.152 Experts predict that within a year “darknets should be able to
offer the same performance as traditional P2P software by exploiting social
networking.”153
[40] Skeptics contend that the infrastructure does not currently exist to support
a widespread shift to anonymity.154 They argue that efforts to develop anonymous
file sharing are self-limiting because true anonymity requires the elimination of
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any intermediaries.155 Therefore, anonymous sharing can only occur amongst
mini-networks of small groups of friends that do not scale.156 This criticism does
not account for recent improvements in scalability, as noted in the Freenet model.
Moreover, the Microsoft engineers concluded that even if global, public peer-topeer networks were eliminated through legal or technical means, small-world
networks would likely provide a mechanism efficient enough to satisfy a large
percentage of digital media consumers.157
[41] The small-world network effect explains the system of linking up of
related groups of private networks to scale into larger network groups.158
Interconnected small-world networks are comprised of affinity groups that
exchange materials through private networks.159 Even though the individual sets
might be small, users can belong to several sets.160 Those individual sets overlap
(as in a Venn diagram) to form larger groups, and information flows freely and
quickly between the groups.
D. The Darknet’s Impact on Copyrights
1. The Darknet Precludes Copyright Enforcement on the Internet
[42] Recent technological developments involving darknets and P2P
networking make the effective enforcement of copyright virtually impossible.161
John Perry Barlow compared traditional copyright law to a sinking ship and
described the futile efforts to save it: “Legal efforts to keep the old boat floating
are taking three forms: a frenzy of deck chair rearrangement, stern warnings to the
passengers that if she goes down, they will face harsh criminal penalties, and
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serene, glassy-eyed denial.”162 But, enforcement of copyrights through lawsuits
and criminal sanctions is only possible if identification of the direct infringers and
their infringing activity is possible.163 The private and anonymous nature of
darknets severely exacerbates this problem since individual (or even collective)
file use is not traceable.164 Moreover, without usage data, not only will traditional
copyrights be archaic, but also any type of alternative incentive scheme for
authors will be difficult or impossible to implement.
[43] Enforcing a contributory or vicarious liability regime against darknet
service providers presents another challenge. Directly infringing activity on
darknets is undetectable to all outsiders (including service providers), and
darknets are capable of substantial non-infringing uses.165 Users administer and
lock darknets; therefore, service providers cannot monitor or control any
activity.166 Without a central server, it is difficult (if not impossible) to enforce an
injunction.167 Once software is distributed, it is difficult to remove all the
downloaded copies in use, and users holding copies of open source darknet
software can easily copy it, adapt new versions, and make it available throughout
the Internet.168
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2. The Darknet Nullifies Technological Protection Measures
[44] The primary effect of the Darknet is that it renders technological
protection measures (TPMs) wholly unenforceable (or at least impracticable) as a
solution for digital copyright management.169 Some scholars predicted this shift
might happen as early as this year.170
[45] Though its purpose was to warn Microsoft executives about the perils of
TPMs, the Microsoft paper is one of the most comprehensive studies of the
Darknet.171 Based on a set of assumptions regarding the flow of information in the
digital environment, the Microsoft paper warned that any “popular or interesting
content” would inevitably leak into the Darknet.172 Fred von Lohmann asserted
that this failure would result because no content protection system had “yet been
developed, nor [was] one likely to be developed,” that could not be unlocked by at
least one “expert attacker.”173 The engineers explained that once compromised by
one sophisticated user, TPMs are effectively useless to restrict widespread
redistribution where “users have the desire and capability to rapidly duplicate and
propagate the formerly protected work.”174
[46] Thus, with the spread of distributed networking, a single “leak” is enough
to neutralize all TPMs for a particular work.175 Without perfect protection, TPMs
are useless at preventing subsequent copying.176 Fred von Lohmann described this
problem as a smart cow problem: “It only takes one smart cow to lift the latch on
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the gate and then all the less sophisticated cows just trod on out behind it.”177 He
went on to explain that not every peer is circumventing. To the contrary, most are
just copying because much of the content found in the Darknet has been precircumvented for their convenience.178
[47] A more recent scientific survey of a decade of peer production reiterated
the idea that there seems to be no effective technological “impediments to
darknet-based . . . file sharing technologies[, which are] growing in convenience,
aggregate bandwidth and efficiency.”179 If darknets persist and become
widespread, providing “low cost, high-quality service to a large group of
consumers,” the Darknet’s free alternatives will be a substantial “competitor to
legal commerce.”180 In fact, from an economic standpoint, TPMs might “act as a
disincentive to legal commerce.”181 A securely protected file for sale is
significantly less attractive to a potential user than an alternative that is an equally
useful TPM-free version acquired from the Darknet.182
II. RELINQUISHING CONTROL OVER DIGITAL WORKS WILL
ACHIEVE COPYRIGHT’S INTENDED GOAL
A. The Goal and Function of Copyright
[48] The paramount goal of copyright law is to promote progress in science and
the useful arts and to encourage the creation and mass dissemination of a wide
variety of expressive works.183 Traditionally, copyrights have been the means by
177
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which that goal is achieved.184 As intellectual property has public-goods
characteristics, the right to control the reproduction and dissemination of their
works allows authors and publishers to recover their investment without the risk
of being undercut in the market.185 However, the control granted to authors is
limited by the public’s interest in preserving a vibrant public domain from which
consumers and future authors may draw.186 Thus, “copyright assures authors the
right in their original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the
ideas and information conveyed . . . .”187
[49] Due to the Darknet, the current copyright regime is no longer an effective
incentive to encourage the creation and dissemination of digital works. Therefore,
the law must be restructured to ensure the continued promotion of progress in the
digital era. One possible approach is ceding legal control to provide an incentive
to create new digital works in the Darknet era.
B. Stronger Protection Measures are Unenforceable and Deter Innovation
[50] Faced with imminent technological challenges, scholars advise that
copyright owners basically have two choices for remuneration: strive for stronger
copyright protection or sacrifice control, embrace new technology, and seek out
alternative methods of compensation.188 As outlined above, the Darknet renders
existing copyrights largely impotent on the Internet, and TPMs offer little solace
to creators and distributors wishing to control access to their digital works.189 It
follows that increased protection is unlikely to succeed.
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[51] Those striving for stronger protection, stiff penalties, and perfect
enforcement of their rights are likely doomed.190 These individuals pursue
impenetrable TPMs fortified by aggressive legal prohibitions against
technological circumvention.191 Following traditional copyright ideologies, it may
seem intuitive that as copying becomes cheaper and easier, protection should
increase proportionally because creators will be forced to compete with a greater
number of copiers and copies.192 However, stronger protection for digital works
seems unlikely to succeed as the Darknet grows and smart cows become
smarter.193 According to the Microsoft engineers’ Darknet assumptions, anything
less than total success would mean total failure for any TPM strategy.194 Not only
is perfect control impossible to realize in the Darknet era, but stronger protection
also upsets the balance copyright legislators endeavor to achieve between
protecting authors’ rights and granting the public access to works. For instance,
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), enacted to bolster the
effectiveness of TPMs by prohibiting circumvention, precludes uses of digital
works that would be considered fair uses for identical analog works.195 Preventing
access to a digital work for purposes of parody or criticism impinges on users’
First Amendment rights.196 Additionally, stronger protection stimulates the
production of less efficient technology and encourages darknets.
C. Relinquishing Control Over Digital Works Will Promote Progress
[52] Since stronger protection is not likely to have a positive effect, copyright
owners must (by default) surrender control and embrace alternative methods of
compensation.197 Fortunately, absent traditional copyrights, digital technology
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eliminates the need for distribution incentives and provides alternative incentive
structures that will ensure the creation of new creative works.198
[53] Although procedures, processes, systems, and methods of operation are
not protected by copyright per se,199 legislation intended to promote progress
should consider encouraging technological innovation in addition to the creation
and dissemination of creative works. At a minimum, copyright should not protect
authors’ financial interests at the expense of encouraging inferior distribution
technology. Professor Litman astutely noted that as long as widespread
dissemination remains a central goal of copyright, “prohibiting sharing to protect
the market for copy sales is exactly backward.”200 File sharing through centralized
distributed networks is clearly a more effective and efficient medium for
dissemination than either selling physical copies or distributing them through
darknets. As described above, developments in the law that imposed liability on
various market players shaped the development of Darknet architectures inferior
to their P2P predecessors in terms of economic efficiency and social welfare.201
Excessive caution to avoid liability chilled innovation and censored ideas and
communication.202 If the rise of the Darknet can be directly attributed to
increasingly strong copyright protection and TPMs, then the fall of the Darknet
will require weaker copyright protection and less technological control.
1. Copyright Shelters Encourage Innovation
[54] Historically, “copyright shelters and exemptions have . . . encouraged
rapid investment and growth in new media of expression.”203 For example,
despite severe opposition from the music industry, the Supreme Court ruled that
making and selling piano rolls did not infringe any copyrights.204 The player
198
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piano ultimately led to the phonograph, which was the basis for the entire
recording industry.205 Similarly, by denying infringing activity, courts refused to
allow the entertainment industry to control technologies such as radio, cable
television, and the VCR.206 The principle common to the development of each of
those revolutionary technologies has been termed an “innovate first, make
adjustments later” approach.207 Innovators were not required to seek permission
from industry incumbents prior to designing their products.208 Generally, the rule
has morphed into a chilling “permission first, innovation later” requirement.209
Recent DMCA legislation makes it unlawful to circumvent TPMs without first
obtaining authorization from the rights holder.210 Also, in order to develop a
device capable of playing a DVD, an innovator must first obtain a license from
the DVD Copy Control Association, the industry group holding the necessary
rights.211
[55] Traditional copyright protection is based on the argument that “without the
incentives provided by copyright, entrepreneurs will refuse to invest in new
media.”212 But there is empirical evidence to the contrary. “[N]ew media has
flourished and became remunerative when people invested in producing and
distributing them first, and sorted out how they were going to protect their . . .
rights [or realize profits] only after they had found their markets.”213 Requiring
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licenses for several underlying pieces of technology or to minute parts of creative
works can be especially chilling to new or relatively smaller market players.214
These smaller market players tend to be the most innovative in terms of
developing new technologies and discovering new ways to charge for value.215 It
was young, creative companies, free from legal liabilities and unencumbered by
industry customs, which were responsible for developing the first MP3
technology.216 That technology paved the way for a vibrant new digital music
market and Apple’s enormously successful iPod empire.217 Additionally, new
technologies are more vulnerable to legal challenges because it might be more
difficult for courts to see their long-term value without empirical evidence.218
[56] Innovation works best when unfettered by governmental requirements.219
Beyond direct restrictions, the mere threat of lawsuits is likely to deter a
significant amount of innovation.220 It seems that this threat is extending the reach
of copyrights deep into the realm of the public domain and eclipsing legitimate
uses of works.221 In the past, the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA),
working in conjunction with the Federal Communications Commission, relied on
copyrights mandating the inclusion of copy-protection technology in some home
copying devices222 to coerce companies (including RealNetworks and Microsoft)

unauthorized copies of software in circulation are part of the reason why the software market is
booming. Id.
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to cut innovative features out of their media software programs.223 Just before the
release of LW5, Arista Records sued LimeWire, alleging copyright infringement
for distributing file sharing software.224 Presumably concerned that copyrights
might be exceeding their appropriate grasp, the Electronic Frontier Foundation
(EFF) submitted an amicus brief urging the court to adopt a standard of liability
that would “not discourage the development of technologies with lawful and
unlawful uses.”225 The EFF brief also argued that developers should not be held
liable for copyright infringement based on misuses of their technology that they
did not actively promote.226
2. Restructuring Digital Copyright Law
[57] Digital technology has enabled new uses (including syncing, remixing,
and mash-ups) that do not necessarily coincide with the traditional bundle of
copyright rights. To appropriately advance copyright’s stated goal of promoting
progress, copyright law should be revised to permit all uses of works that the
creator makes available to the public in digital format.227 Once a creator
authorizes the release of a work in a digital format, all digital uses should be
permitted, including reproduction, adaptation and modification, distribution,
public performance, and public display of any digital content.
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[58] Promoting progress requires that the public be able to read, view, and
listen to available works, and that they “be able to learn from them: to extract
facts and ideas from them, to make them their own, and to be able to build on
them.”228 Permitting all digital uses would enable consumers and would-be future
producers to benefit fully from the works available to them. Professor Litman
argues that using copyrights to encourage dissemination actually ensures the
public’s ability to enjoy those works by deterring creators from completely
preventing access through self-help mechanisms.229 In the Darknet era, however,
authors rely on copyright protection to enforce their self-help technological
measures to increase technological control over their works, thus locking those
works away from the public. Since perfect control is neither possible nor socially
desirable, it is better to permit copying for the purpose of distributing works for
the enjoyment of the public. Further, an all-encompassing exception would
prevent underproduction and eliminate uncertainty as to whether a particular
behavior is infringing. Under this revised regime, P2P file sharing would not
constitute infringement and P2P service providers would not be liable for
infringement.
a. A Commercial/Non-Commercial Distinction is Unnecessary
[59] A number of scholars have extolled the virtues of authorizing noncommercial uses of other people’s works.230 This might seem like a tempting
option, especially since the public seems to believe that copyright law
distinguishes between commercial and private behavior.231 But enforcing a noncommercial rule is impracticable in the digital realm since the line between
commercial and non-commercial uses is increasingly blurred.
[60] Consumers often advance a general fairness argument that copying of
other people’s works is okay so long as the copier is not making money.232 This
public attitude likely stems from uncertainty in judicial and legislative attempts to
define non-commercial uses.

228

Revising Copyright, supra note 203, at 33.

229

Id.

230

See Sharing and Stealing, supra note 200, at 33.

231

See Revising Copyright, supra note 203, at 40.

232

Id.

33

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XVI, Issue 4

[61] The Audio Home Recording Act explicitly protects private, “noncommercial” music copying.233 The accompanying Senate report, however,
broadly and vaguely defines non-commercial purposes as those not made for
“indirect or direct commercial advantage.”234 Apparently, consideration is not
required to classify a transaction as being for a commercial purpose since a sale is
not required to demonstrate commercial use and obtaining a service for free that
users would normally be required to purchase constitutes a commercial use.235
Additionally, non-commercial protection is specifically denied to many devices
and uses, most notably the use of personal computers and hard drives to make
copies.236 For example, electronically sending a file to an anonymous recipient is
not a personal use.237 The No Electronic Theft (NET) Act goes so far as to
criminalize copying for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial
gain,238 which includes the receipt of “anything of value.”239 It seems possible to
construe almost any transaction as being for indirect commercial benefit or
private financial gain.
[62] In proposing a non-commercial use levy to compensate authors of digital
works, Professor Netanel’s definition of non-commercial included any use where
“the individual is not selling copies of, access to, or advertising in connection
with the copyright-protected work.”240 He specifically protected an “individual’s
receipt of other works in digital format over P2P file swapping networks.”241
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However, Netanel left the term “selling” undefined, creating the same ambiguity
that exists under current interpretations of non-commercial purposes.242 If a
commercial/non-commercial distinction were made, content distributors and
service providers could easily escape liability by setting up their organizations as
non-profit agencies or by bartering and cross licensing to avoid transactions that
would otherwise be considered commercial sales. Business models that do not
charge for content, but profit through alternative channels such as advertisements
or subscriptions, might ride the fence if they support user-generated content, since
service providers do not control whether their content contains potentially
infringing work.243
[63] Finally, the distinction between commercial and non-commercial
transactions might be irrelevant since TPMs will be largely ineffective.244 Most
content, especially popular works, will be available for free in the Darknet, so the
cost of content will approach zero.245 It will not be profitable to sell any digital
goods.246
3. The Effects of a Digital Use Exception
a. Promote Innovation
i. Develop Superior Distribution Technology
[64] A digital use shelter would serve the public interest by promoting
innovation. If network developers were free from potential secondary liability,
they would have an incentive to promote superior P2P systems instead of
darknets. Due to the benefits from the reduction in bandwidth use on their servers,
accomplished by shifting the sharing to users’ computers, ISPs are the main
developers and purchasers of P2P technology.247 Without risk of liability, ISPs
242
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and entrepreneurs would presumably invest in the most economically efficient
and socially desirable technology, which in this case is centralized distributed
networking. There is evidence of this in China, where relaxed regulations led to
the development of the world’s fastest distributed networks, including Blin.cn,
which is capable of reaching speeds up to fifty times faster than BitTorrent.248
According to a Chinese Internet expert, the lack of copyright enforcement in
China permitted the development of these protocols.249
ii. Quash the Darknet
[65] Most importantly, a digital use exception will keep users out of the
Darknet. Current darknets impose additional costs on consumers because they are
slower, less efficient and less user-friendly than their traditional P2P
counterparts.250 Moreover, darknets carry social costs that traditional P2P
networks do not incur because true anonymity precludes building a reputation or
increasing one’s popularity.251 Permitting digital copying will derail the Darknet
juggernaut by encouraging the development of better distribution technology that
is more attractive to consumers. In turn, this will provide the infrastructure
required for remuneration. The Microsoft engineers advised that in order to
compete with the Darknet, distributors must compete on the Darknet’s own terms:
“convenience and low cost rather than additional security.”252 If programmers
devote time to developing the most efficient P2P technology, consumers will
naturally gravitate away from fallible darknets.
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[66] In the United States, the primary use of darknets is to share files (rather
than circulate political messages),253 so features that enhance the file sharing
experience are presumably more important to consumers than the ancillary
privacy benefits they enjoy in darknets.254 A digital use exception removes the
threat of litigation, thereby lowering the perceived costs of traditional P2P
networks for both developers and consumers. Injecting traditional P2P networks
with content that is unlocked and more likely to be free of viruses than content on
the Darknet would also help make P2P networks a more attractive choice for
consumers.255 Given the cheaper, safer, and more convenient choice, consumers
would opt to use traditional P2P networks, where their identities and activities are
observable.256 Ensuring that users remain where their behavior can be monitored
is the key to providing authors and the content industry with opportunities to
receive compensation for their works.257
b. Promote Progress and Protect Free Speech
[67] As noted above, in the absence of digital copyrights, the proliferation of
P2P networks would stimulate peer production, and the resulting increase in
collaboration and communication would produce better quality works.258
Distributed networking will also secure free speech because eliminating liability
removes the incentive for ISPs to filter and block access to content on their
networks. Further, a digital use exception would limit censorship by minimizing
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the termination of entire P2P systems that block legitimate, non-infringing
activity along with potentially unauthorized acts.
4. A Monopoly is Not Required to Incentivize the Creation of Digital Works
a. Monopolistic Copyrights for Digital Works Do Not Benefit Society
[68] In the shadow of the Darknet, control over digital copies should be
relinquished to generate optimal market conditions and adequate financial
incentives for the creation and distribution of new works.259 In the absence of
digital copyrights, creators and distributors would be free to utilize new
technologies to construct alternative business models that are profitable and
sustainable.260 Although society may grant exclusive rights as an incentive to
produce, the grant is subject to the will and convenience of society and there is
certainly no obligation to do so.261 Thomas Jefferson provided the following
illustration of the principle:
Society may give an exclusive right to the profits arising from
inventions, as an encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may
produce utility, but this may or may not be done, according to the
will and convenience of the society, without claim or complaint
from any body. . . . [T]he exclusive right to invention [is] given not
of natural right, but for the benefit of society . . . .262
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When applied to digital works, existing copyright laws are detrimental to the
social welfare and restrain innovation.263
[69] To the extent that adequate financial incentives or market conditions exist
to incentivize the creation and distribution of new works, copyrights are
superfluous; so it is advisable not to recognize those protections.264 In the Darknet
era, existing copyrights no longer provide the proper incentive for the creation of
digital works and should be abrogated to foster market conditions that will be an
adequate substitute.265 Abandoning control of digital works will provide the
appropriate incentive regime necessary to achieve copyright’s goal of stimulating
artistic creativity for the public good.266
b. Digital Copyrights Are Economically Inefficient
i. Digital Copyrights to Incentivize Distribution Are Redundant
[70] By examining the incentives for creating and distributing works
separately, Professor Raymond Ku explains that there is no longer reason to
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provide copyright protection for digital works.267 “Until recently, most means of
mass dissemination required a significant capital investment.”268 Traditionally,
a copyright owner’s exclusive right to control the reproduction and distribution of
information was necessary to prevent members of the public from free riding,
enjoying the benefits of the work without contributing to defray real publication
costs.269 Artificial property rights, however, are not appropriate to encourage
public dissemination of digital works because consumers internalize reproduction
and distribution costs through distributed networking.270 As noted by Ku, because
digital distributed networking replaces many traditional publication and
distribution functions, copyrights result in a faulty transfer of wealth.271 Further,
sharing copies through distributed networking minimizes marketing costs and
efficiently responds to consumer demand.272 In fact, the features of distributed
networking which increase a work’s popularity enable consumers to recapture a
portion of the excess incentive available for popular works.273 Allowing creators
to recover costs that are already absorbed by the public is double dipping274 and
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renders the traditional copyright scheme little more than “an argument for
protecting content distributors in a world in which middlemen are obsolete.”275
ii. Digital Copyrights Are Not the Best Incentive for Creation
[71] Professor Ku also demonstrated that exclusive rights created by copyrights
are neither necessary nor the most efficient means of encouraging creation.276 As
discussed above, the lowered cost of peer production compensates for some
underproduction.277 Without high publication and distribution expenses for digital
works, the fixed, one-time cost of creation is the only cost to make content
available to the public.278 So long as file use and user behavior is visible, the
alternative business models discussed in section III would allow efficient recovery
of the cost.
III.

MARKET FORCES WILL SUPPLY THE INCENTIVE TO
CREATE AND DISSEMINATE IDEAS

[72] As peer production thrives on distributed networks, amateur volunteer
creation will compensate for some underproduction that might be caused by a
digital use exception. This solution is incomplete. While volunteer expression is
certainly an indispensible element of a democratic society, the creation of many
expressive works, including full-length motion pictures, novels, television shows,
and investigative journalism, requires a significant material commitment of time,
expertise, and money.279 While many authorities agree in some permissive use of
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expressive works, they disagree as to the proper way to incentivize creation
should the law change.280
[73] The main challenge to voluntary or compulsory licensing systems is that
consumers are not willing to pay for content when they can obtain a sufficient or
superior substitute for free on the Darknet.281 Regardless, if it is permissible to use
digital works, market forces will ensure that intermediaries (including publishers,
distributors, and service providers)282 and creators receive compensation for their
works.283 Empirical evidence suggests consumers are willing to pay for the
ancillary products and services they value, therefore, it is possible for publishers,
distributors, and service providers to profit by delivering content bundled with
valuable alternatives or collateral products and services that consumers desire.284
It might also be possible to collect funds from consumers by levying a tax on
necessary media-related goods or services.285 Additionally, intermediaries could
profit through advertising.286 While advertising revenue depends on content to
drive consumer traffic to websites, intermediaries also value traffic for the
information consumers leave behind regarding their behavior and preferences.287
Just as consumers will pay intermediaries for valuable ancillary goods and
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services, intermediaries will commission creators to provide original content that
drives traffic to their sites and sells their corresponding services.288
A. Peer Production and Volunteerism
[74] Volunteerism and amateur works will represent a large portion of new
works including original materials like blogs, videos, and music, as well as
adaptations such as mash-ups and remixes.289 Innovative technology and
distributed networking encourage peer production and spur output by reducing the
overall cost of creating and distributing new works.290 If protected by a copyright
shelter, prosumers will voluntarily donate creative resources to create, publish,
and disseminate their own digital media, thereby flooding the market with
amateur works.291 These creators might benefit in non-monetary ways, such as
reputation or the simple enjoyment of creating the work. Realistically, however,
other resources might be necessary to recoup real costs of creation and encourage
the production of quality goods.
B. Consumers Will Not Pay For Content When a
Free Alternative is Available
1. Voluntary Collective Licensing: Pay to Use
[75] Voluntary collective licensing regimes operate by offering consumers the
freedom to use content in exchange for a fee.292 Instead of seeking permission
from each individual rights-holder, consumers purchase use rights from collection
societies that aggregate copyrighted content and manage the collection and

288

See id.

289

See Daryl Lim, Beyond Microsoft: Intellectual Property, Peer Production and the Law’s
Concern with Market Dominance, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 291, 314
(2008).
290

See id. at 301-04.
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Lemley & Reese, supra note 29, at 1433.

292

See ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., A BETTER WAY FORWARD: VOLUNTARY COLLECTIVE LICENSING
OF MUSIC FILE SHARING 1 (2008), at 1, http://www.eff.org/files/collective_lic_wp.pdf.
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distribution of funds.293 The scheme is voluntary because consumers, creators,
and rights holders choose whether they will participate.294
[76] In light of the Darknet, the primary challenge to this regime is that
consumers are simply unwilling to pay for content.295 The EFF endorses this
model and proposes the distribution of a five-dollar monthly fee to rights-holders;
based on the popularity of their works.296 The EFF authors believe that as long as
the fee is reasonable, the majority of file sharers will opt to pay rather than engage
in complex evasion efforts.297 Before darknets, five dollars a month would have
seemed like a small price to pay compared to the severe penalty a consumer
would face in an industry lawsuit as well as to the increasingly high transaction
costs due to TPMs.298
[77] This scheme, however, is unlikely to prosper, as the Darknet becomes a
substantial competitor to legitimate commerce. Even a low monthly fee would
seem unreasonable compared to a free, unrestricted substitute that does not carry
the threat of a lawsuit. This scheme carries a transaction cost for the user of
locating the proper collecting society, visiting its website, and executing the
payment transaction.299 The cost increases if a consumer must visit multiple
collection societies to gather permission to use all the content they desire. This

293

Id.

294

Barry M. Massarsky, The Operating Dynamics Behind ASCAP, BMI and SESAC, The U.S.
Performing Rights Societies, http://www.cni.org/docs/ima.ip-workshop/Massarsky.html (last
visited May 20, 2010). Existing systems are used by collective rights organizations (such as
ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC) and copyright clearinghouses. Id. By paying a flat fee, anybody can
make a public performance of songs in the repertories of these organizations, which will collect
the license fees and distribute the proceeds to their members). Id.
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See ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., supra note 292, at 5.
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Id. at 1.
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Id.
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Yu, supra note 283, at 714.
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In the time it takes a consumer to find the collection society website, determine whether that
organization controls the particular content they seek, and enter their credit card information (all
this before even searching and downloading content), the consumer could have easily clicked on a
folder on their desktop to access the Darknet, located a file, and downloaded it for free.
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might be especially problematic where a consumer is searching for permission to
use marginal content.
[78] Even without darknets, a voluntary system may also encourage free riding
by allowing a group of friends to purchase one membership and share all of the
content outside the system.300 Because sharing is easy to do and virtually
impossible to trace, Darknets merely make this possible on a larger scale.301 Since
TPMs will be largely ineffective in the Darknet era, it will be difficult to keep
materials out of the hands of consumers that have not paid. Additionally, if
consumers continue to share in darknets without detection, it will be difficult or
impossible to measure the popularity of works to determine the appropriate
distribution of funds.
[79] Moreover, the expected flood of peer production might pose a significant
threat to a voluntary system. Even with an opt-in system, all amateur producers
could claim they are entitled to a share of the royalty pool. Also, since peer
production encourages collaboration, and copyright has traditionally avoided
value judgments, determining who should be entitled to receive compensation
will be difficult. Peer-produced content is often mashed-up or remixed from preexisting works, often appropriating only a tiny fraction of the underlying work.302
It will be impracticable, if not impossible, to measure the use of a particular work
in those instances. Thus, collection agencies will have to deal with millions of
amateur producers and might have to divvy up the pool of funds into
micropayments, thereby reducing the possibility of reasonably compensating
creators.
2. Compulsory Licensing: Use, Then Pay
[80] Under a compulsory licensing scheme, consumers are free to use protected
works without first seeking permission from the copyright owner, but they are
required to pay a statutory fee.303 Similar to voluntary collective licensing
regimes, rights holders divide the collected fee.304 In contrast to voluntary
300

Yu, supra note 283, at 715.
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See id.
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See Netanel, supra note 240, at 3.
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See Yu, supra note 283, at 704.
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collective licensing, consumers and rights-holders cannot choose whether to
participate.305 The government or an independent body decides what will be
subject to payment and sets the rates.306 This type of system is most often
imposed as a compromise to resolve market failure and promote innovation.307 It
is doubtful that compulsory licensing would compensate creators in the Darknet
era for most of the same reasons voluntary licensing would fail.
[81] It is unlikely that charging a compulsory fee would be a sufficient remedy
because consumers are unwilling to pay for content where even a small fee seems
unreasonable given that there is a free alternative in the Darknet. Even if users
could locate rights holders through the agencies that collect and distribute funds,
they still face transaction costs in executing payments they do not incur in the
Darknet. Although the payment is compulsory, it will be unenforceable because
consumers will retreat to the Darknet to share privately, and TPMs will be an
ineffective impediment. Moreover, a blanket fee would be difficult to distribute
based on popularity if use is undetectable. Even if the fee could be collected on a
per-use basis, it would be difficult to determine pricing and distribution since use
is often de minimis, and consumers might imperceptibly mix several works
together.
C. Consumers Will Compensate Intermediaries
1. A Levy System
[82] Since consumers refuse to pay for content, some scholars propose
imposing a statutory levy on related goods or services purchased by consumers to
raise funds for the creation of new works.308 The levy scheme is derived from the
compulsory license model except, rather than accounting for fees based on the use
of content, a levy is automatically collected on the sale of software, services, or
305

See id.

306

See id.

307
See id. at 704-713 (providing a discussion of compulsory licensing). Compulsory licensing has
been used in the U.S. since it was established in the 1909 Copyright Act for purposes of musical
compositions. 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1952) (repealed 1978); see also Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.
§§ 111, 115-16, 118 (2006) (adding compulsory licenses for jukeboxes); Copyright Act of 1976,
17 U.S.C. § 118 (2006) (adding compulsory licenses for public broadcasting); Copyright Act of
1976, 17 U.S.C. § 111 (adding compulsory licenses for cable television).
308
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hardware that are related to digital media.309 Admittedly, a levy system solves
many of the problems of voluntary or compulsory licensing schemes. But the
remaining challenges are insurmountable, and a levy is not necessary to
compensate creators.
[83] Fee collection in the levy system is a reasonably viable task that
minimizes the transaction costs associated with collecting fees in the licensing
models discussed above. Payment is compulsory, and, unlike content, hardware
and services do not have a free Darknet equivalent.310 Collection of the levy can
be combined with payments the consumer is already required to make in order to
enjoy products or services related to digital media use. As this would essentially
pass the tax on to consumers through increased prices, consumers would
indirectly pay for access to content.311 “Likely candidates for taxation include
Internet access, P2P software and services, computer hardware, consumer
electronic devices (such as CD burners, MP3 players, and digital video recorders)
used to copy, store, transmit, or perform downloaded files, and storage media
(like blank CDs) used with those devices.”312 Although it is possible to collect a
fee under the levy regime, it will remain difficult to set an optimal surcharge
price, and some consumers would pay for content they do not use.313
[84] It is unclear whether imposing a levy would chill innovation. Some
scholars contend that imposing a levy is essentially the same as enacting a thirdparty liability rule since taxing innovation will naturally discourage it to an
extent.314 It is more likely that the cost would be passed on to consumers instead
309

Lemley & Reese, supra note 29, at 1406. The Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 (AHRA)
enacted a similar plan, which provides for a levy on all blank digital audio media and digital audio
recorders, with the revenue allocated among music copyright owners. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1004-07
(2006). Similar systems exist or are being implemented in Canada and the European Union, where
computer purchasers pay a fee (currently twelve Euros in Germany) into a fund to compensate
copyright owners. Lemley & Reese, supra note 29, at 1406-07.
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See Lemley & Reese, supra note 29, at 1407-08.

311

Jacover, supra note 25, at 2253.

312

Netanel, supra note 240, at 4.
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Lemley & Reese, supra note 29, at 1408-09 (arguing that whether the government or a private
group sets the levy rate, “they will not likely face the discipline of the market [so there is a risk]
they will not do so at a market-clearing price.”).
314
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of stifling innovation with liability rules.315 Further, imposing a tax on wide
categories of goods eliminates the possibility that service and product providers
will be at a competitive disadvantage.316 There is also a risk that pricing entire
categories of new goods or services too high for consumers to adopt these
methods will cause them to fail before the world has an opportunity to understand
their full potential. Additionally, taxing a broad range of products increases the
likelihood that some consumers will pay for content they do not use.
[85] The greatest obstacle with a levy system is distributing the funds. If files
were not exchanged on darknets, it would be possible to use digital tracking and
metering technology to measure consumers’ actual use and valuation of works.317
Funds could probably be distributed accordingly.318 But, even if it were possible
to account for the fee on a per-use basis, it would be difficult to determine pricing
and distribution, since consumers will often use only partial works. Additionally,
if a system is designed with the capability of monitoring all consumption, and it is
reasonably easy for creators to subscribe to receive funds, a flood of amateur
creators would likely demand payment for their works even though they currently
display them for free. Like collective and compulsory licensing schemes, forcing
the levy regime to dole out its limited funds in micropayments amongst all
possible players would be futile. It is doubtful that creators of new content would
digitally identify all underlying work to make it traceable.319 If automatic digital
identification is impossible, or if copying technology lacks the ability to
reproduce metadata properly, prosumers are unlikely to comply.
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See Jacover, supra note 25, at 2253.
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See Netanel, supra note 240, at 21.

317

Id. at 29.
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Id.
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Id. at 57 (suggesting that it might be beneficial to require creators and P2P disseminators of
modified versions of works to identify the author of the underlying work). They could also be
required to leave any copyright management information embedded in the underlying work intact.
Id.
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2. Consumers Will Pay for the Ancillary Goods and Services They Value
a. It Is Possible to “Compete with Free”
[86] Darknets offering of perfect, unrestricted copies of works that are easily
accessible at no cost, will force copyright owners to “compete with free.”320
Traditional, non-digital industries have proven this is both possible and
profitable.321 Examples include bottled water, cable television, private education,
and Starbucks coffee.322
[87] Although consumers are reluctant to pay for content, they have
demonstrated that they are willing to pay for ancillary goods and better service,
even when they are able to obtain identical or substantially similar versions of the
content at no cost.323 Therefore, service providers can lure consumers away from
free darknet works by offering a superior alternative at a competitive price.324
Moreover, it becomes increasingly possible to cross-subsidize as the cost to create
and distribute content approaches zero.325 When bundled together with other
goods or services, consumers seemingly pay for content, but the actual value to
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Lohmann, supra note 116, at 644.
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Id.
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Id. Bottled water competes with tap water. Consumers pay for cable television when broadcast
stations are available for free. Free public education is mandated by the government. A twelveounce cup of Starbucks coffee starts at about $1.50 while coffee is free at most office buildings or
costs about a quarter per cup to brew at home. Starbucks Newsroom, Mar. 9, 2010,
http://news.starbucks.com/article_display.cfm?article_id=337.
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See Lohman, supra note 116, at 644.
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See Jacover, supra note 25, at 2247. Michael Robertson, President and CEO of MP3.com,
made a similar comment about the need to take affirmative steps in providing music online:
“Some music fans will always copy songs illegally . . . but if you make it easy enough for them to
pay for music on the Net, the majority of them will.” Julian Dibbell, The Record Industry’s Digital
Daze, ROLLING STONE, Nov. 26, 1998, at 104.
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Chris Anderson, Free! Why $0.00 Is the Future of Business, WIRED, Feb. 25, 2008, available at
http://www.wired.com/techbiz/it/magazine/16-03/ff_free? (noting that in a competitive market like
the Internet, the cost to consumers of many aspects of technology are approaching zero: “Storage
now joins bandwidth (YouTube: free) and processing power (Google: free) in the race to the
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the consumer derives from the auxiliary product or service they receive with that
content.326
b. Alternative Business Models
[88] Entrepreneurs have proven highly capable of developing new ways of
extracting value from the Internet.327 A wide variety of sustainable business
models, including cross-subsidization, bundling or tying, and loss leading,328
permit businesses to recognize profits.329 Either successful business models offer
consumers superior quality, convenience, or auxiliary services; or they tie primary
content to a valuable element or feature that cannot be easily reproduced.330
Subscription or paid services offer convenience, allowing consumers to easily
locate desired content, time- and space-shift compatibly formatted files, store and
organize collections, and easily share files.331 Apple’s iTunes had sold over five
billion songs as of June 2008, when the same music and video content was clearly

326

For instance, I am personally quite entrenched in Apple’s iMedia empire. Even though I could
easily locate free versions of content on the Internet, I do not mind paying $.99 per song or $1.99
per TV show on iTunes. For me, the value is in the convenience and quality of iTunes’ services. I
use Apple’s free software to organize my library and create customized playlists. All of my iMedia
comes free of viruses, in a reliable and consistent format that is interoperable with my mobile
devices. Besides digital portability, I am free to format-shift most of the content (for my own
personal use, of course) to a CD or DVD to watch on my TV. The iTunes store is usually the only
place I have to search for new music, and I appreciate that songs are available for purchase on
their public release date. I can listen to samples and browse reviews of media before I purchase
them. iTunes’ Genius application tracks my behavior and makes remarkably personal
recommendations for new music I might enjoy. For me, $.99 per song seems like a great value
when I consider all the services I receive. See generally iTunes, http://www.apple.com/itunes (last
visited May 20, 2010).
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See Anderson, supra note 325 (stating that cross subsidization is the method of supporting the
sale of one product with the profits from another). Similarly, in loss leading one product is given
away with the sale of another good. Id. The classic example is the Gillette razor and blades model,
whereby a razor is given away to stimulate sale of blades. Id.

329

See Symposium, supra note 327, at 23-30.

330

See id.

331

See Matthew C. Mousley, Note, Peer-to-Peer Combat: The Entertainment Industry’s Arsenal
in Its War on Digital Piracy, 48 VILL. L. REV. 667, 692 (2003).
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available for free on the Internet.332 Paid services often give consumers benefits
over their free counterparts, including the option to forgo advertising.333 For
instance, United Online’s paid Internet access is advertising-free and successfully
competes with its own advertising-supported free service.334 Auxiliary services
can include updates of informational works, maintenance services, or help
lines.335 Content can be bundled with physical merchandise, such as autographed
memorabilia, or services, such as hard copies of data, concerts, or live
performances.336
[89] For example, U2’s latest album, No Line on the Horizon, sold online in
MP3 format for $3.99.337 It was also released in five physical formats, including a
332

See iTunes Store Tops Over Five Billion Songs Sold, http://www.apple.com/pr/library/
2008/06/19itunes.html (last visited May 20, 2010). iTunes initially used a TPM called FairPlay,
but it provided weak protection (ineffective in preventing piracy). Steve Jobs, Thoughts on Music,
Feb. 6, 2007, http://www.apple.com/hotnews/thoughtsonmusic; See Nicola F. Sharpe &
Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Is Apple Playing Fair? Navigating the iPod FairPlay DRM Controversy,
5 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 332, 333-34 (2007). This was likely purposefully designed that
way since iTunes software enabled consumers to burn songs onto CDs rendering then
unencrypted, unprotected and beyond the control of FairPlay. JIM FLYNN, HOW TO COMPETE WITH
FREE:
DEBUNKING
THE
DIGITAL
RIGHTS
MANAGEMENT
MYTH
1
(2005),
http://images.eztakes.com/laf/store/docs/How-to-Compete-with-Free.pdf. FairPlay, however, was
instrumental in Apple’s success because Apple’s iPod was designed to be interoperable with
FairPlay encoded files so FairPlay prevented competition. Id.
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See, e.g., Juno, http://www.juno.com (last visited May 20, 2010) (advertising that Juno, United
Online’s Internet service provider affiliate, offers limited, free, ad-supported Internet service and
paid Internet service without advertisements).
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Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control Over New Technologies of Dissemination, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1644 (2001); see also RedHat, http://www.redhat.com/about/
whysubscriptions (last visited May 20, 2010) (showing that Red Hat offers two versions of its
software—a paid-for supported version and a freely downloadable version). Red Hat became a
leading Linux vendor by distributing a free version of its software and charging customers for
support services. See generally RedHat Global Support Services, https://www redhat.com/
apps/support (last visited May 20, 2010). Although versions of Red Hat Linux are available for
free, Red Hat continues to receive the majority of its revenues from support subscribers. See
generally Matt Asay, Red Hat’s Q3 Earnings Defy Gravity, CNET NEWS, Dec. 22, 2009,
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13505_3-10420488-16.html (last visited May 20, 2010).
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Ginsburg, supra note 335, at 1644.
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standard CD, a vinyl LP, two limited-edition CDs (with a booklet and a poster or
a sixty page magazine), and a box format featuring a DVD and hardback book,
priced up to $64.99.338 Perhaps most interestingly, before users could purchase the
album, they could stream it for free on MySpace.339 The album debuted at number
one, selling 484,000 copies in its first week.340 Since copyrights for physical
goods remain intact, tiered marketing strategies can be profitable.341 Additionally,
creators can capitalize on their right to first publication by timing releases
appropriately and charging more for the initial distribution.342
D. Advertising Will Compensate Intermediaries
1. The Value of Advertising
[90] Advertising is one of the highest-profile and most profitable business
models on the Internet.343 Under the advertising model, intermediaries give away
intellectual property to attract visitors to websites.344 They then sell advertising
space on those sites to others.345 Advertising revenue comes from banners, paid
inclusion in search results, paid listing in information services, and lead
generation.346 “[T]he multi-billion dollar broadcast TV industry effectively gives
away its intellectual property to viewers, supporting itself almost exclusively on
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Leah Greenblatt, U2 and the $3.99 Album: Great Marketing or Financial Folly?, ENT. WKLY.,
Mar. 5, 2009, http://popwatch.ew.com/popwatch/2009/03/u2-and-the-399.html; U2.com Shop,
https://u2.store2.livenation.com/cgi-bin/WebObjects/Store.woa/wa/artist?artistName=U2com&
sourceCode=U2CWEB (last visited May 20, 2010).
339
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(last
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advertising.”347 In the digital realm, companies offer quality content or free
products and services to encourage consumers to visit websites and to build
audiences that advertisers will pay to reach. For example, advertising supports
virtually everything Google offers to consumers (including Gmail, Picasa, and
GOOG-411).348 Website traffic is critical in realizing advertising revenue since
advertising revenue increases with traffic volume and the amount of time
consumers spend using online services. Therefore, it is in the best interest of
intermediaries to keep consumers off the Darknet, where they cannot receive
advertising.
2. The Value of Data Mining and Business Intelligence
[91] Website traffic gives service providers another valuable resource: the
ability to collect data from its visitors regarding their activity and preferences.349
When consumers download songs, review products, vote in surveys, search for
products, and enter personal information into a social networking profile page,
they leave behind data regarding their preferences and behaviors.350 Data mining,
the practice of collecting and analyzing digital consumer behavior data, is part of
a larger category of business intelligence tools that help companies maximize
profits.351 Data mining allows service providers to sift through an enormous
amount of consumer information to find precious business intelligence by
uncovering hidden patterns.352
[92] Service providers cannot track and log user activity on darknets.353
Granting consumers free access to content has become a means of drawing
consumers to websites for purposes of gathering useful data about their identities
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and preferences.354 This information is extremely valuable to data miners, who
use it to discover inherent trends and tendencies in historical information.355 They
use these discoveries to make statistical predictions and better business
decisions.356 Service providers also benefit from data mining by providing
consumers with more specialized experiences according to their preferences.357
Targeted advertising and specialized experiences sell at premium prices.358
[93] Business intelligence is growing in popularity, and social networking sites
have recently announced plans to mine data collected from their users’
activities.359 For instance, Facebook, a social networking site, offers advertisers a
Facebook Insights statistics package that provides valuable data metrics including
user activity, fan demographics, ad performance, and trends.360 Some content
providers mine and analyze their own data, while others enlist third-party
services, such as the SAS Institute.361
[94] Data mining is beneficial to consumers as well.362 Users benefit from
receiving relevant information, products, and services that effectively address
their individual needs.363 Data aggregation services can monitor a user’s activities
354
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of the potential value of data mining by Perry Solomon, vice president of business development
and general manager of Media Solutions, a data mining services provider).
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visited May 20, 2010).
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and make recommendations based on that user’s perceived preferences and the
behaviors of other similar users.364 One data mining service believes the social
networking website MySpace might be able to almost double its revenue, from
forty million dollars a month to seventy million dollars a month, with data
mining.365 Of course, service providers can only collect information if they can
monitor user behavior. Therefore, they have a vested interest in quashing the
Darknet and permitting visitors to consume creative works where their behavior
can be monitored.
3. Intermediaries Will Compensate Creators
[95] Admittedly, alternative business models that provide opportunities for
service providers to profit do not completely replace the function of a copyright
monopoly since they do not necessarily compensate content creators. However,
just as consumers and advertisers will pay for the goods and services they want,
intermediaries will pay creators for the content they value.
[96] Service providers require an influx of traffic to their sites in order to
realize profits under any business model. Content is the dangling carrot that
entices consumers to visit particular websites. Without content, services providers
cannot offer convenience, bundling, or advertising. Since service providers value
quality content that attracts consumers to their sites, they will be motivated to
commission its production. Under a digital use exception copyright regime,
intermediaries become free from infringement liability and armed with the ability
to collect user data. Thus, these service providers will possess the motivation and
necessary resources to fund the production of content that requires significant
capital investment (full-length motion pictures, television shows, and popular
music).366 Further, in a competitive market, distributed networking would ensure
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Netanel, supra note 240, at 76 (noting that some opponents of advertising-supported content
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groups.
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access to content, and intermediaries would compete to create more valuable and
better quality services.367
E. Hope For the Future: A Netflix Case Study
[97] In late 2006, Netflix presented evidence that service providers are willing
to commission content when it announced its Red Envelope Entertainment
division would fund and produce independent shows and feature films.368
[98] In 1984, the United States Supreme Court created a copyright shelter that
sparked a chain reaction of innovation that is directly responsible for creating
virtually every means of digital media technology in existence today.369 In Sony
Corp. v. Universal Studios, better known as the “Betamax Case,”370 the Court
found that copying a television show on a home recording device for purposes of
time shifting did not constitute copyright infringement.371 The Court also held that
the manufacturers of home video recording devices could not be liable for
infringement.372 The Betamax decision created new opportunities for business,
including a booming home video rental market.
[99] Since 1997, Netflix has been a pioneer of Internet DVD distribution.373
The innovative company embraced the low-cost advantages of digital
reproduction and distribution.374 Rather than spending money on packaging,
Netflix cheaply reproduces DVDs, ships films in thin envelopes, and permits
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users to stream content online.375 Instead of costly advertising, Netflix uses data
mining technology to generate buzz with personalized viewing suggestions for
subscribers.376 As its technology gives Netflix a detailed understanding of its
customer base, it can utilize the large-scale advantages of a global marketplace to
invest in media targeting marginal groups.377 Additionally, as Netflix has low
overhead, the company can invest in content that might sell fewer units than a
conventional distributor could afford.378
[100] Unfortunately, Netflix closed Red Envelope Entertainment in 2008, citing
competition with its Hollywood counterparts as the reason for its demise.379 More
precisely, the Hollywood competitors, upon whom Netflix depends for licensing
content, felt threatened by Netflix’s success.380 Whatever its reason for closing,
Netflix’s example indicates that the market will find a way to fund production if
content can generate a profit. We must now speculate whether, if Netflix were
free to distribute content without pressure from its licensing partners, Red
Envelope Entertainment would have produced the next Avatar, or at least the next
Slumdog Millionaire.
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CONCLUSION
[101] Copyright was born in the fallout of a political revolution, when the
drafters of the Constitution created it to safeguard democracy and defend future
generations against the tyranny of monarchy. On the verge of the industrial
revolution, the drafters could foresee that mass production of printed works was
likely to flourish. At the time, a limited monopoly protected innovative printing
technology and the expression contained on the pages that passed through the
presses. Copyright’s monopoly served its purpose for nearly two hundred years by
allowing authors and publishers to recoup the real costs associated with creating
and disseminating new expressive works.
[102] Essentially, the Internet is an enormous distributed network. Its precursor,
ARPAnet, was created in 1969, when two computers were networked and a
message was communicated directly between them.381 This connection sparked a
digital revolution, changing the way the world shares ideas and shifting control
into the hands of ordinary consumers. Building on the distributed network
concept, eighteen-year-old Shawn Fanning released Napster in 1999, spawning a
decade of controversy surrounding unauthorized digital copying.382 In this highly
publicized copyright war,383 sparring factions debated whether the law should
grant creators and publishers more control or allow consumers more access to
creative works. The point, however, is moot. The Darknet has eliminated the
choice.
[103] Just as traditional copyrights were created to defend against tyranny,
digital copyrights must now be abolished in the digital realm for the same reason.
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Liability rules have chipped away at the distributed network infrastructure that
promotes free and efficient distribution of expression. Even worse, media
consolidation is placing power and money in the hands of a privileged few who
work diligently to preserve the status quo. Six companies currently own ninety
percent of the media holdings in the United States: Viacom, Disney, Time
Warner, General Electric, Bertelsmann, and News Corporation.384 In terms of
Internet access, five ISPs (each owned by one of the six major media
conglomerates) share almost fifty percent of the market.385 In 2008 alone, this
media oligopoly earned over $300 billion in revenue,386 and it wields considerable
political power. In the shadow of this oppressive hand, the Darknet provides
consumers a refuge where they can make unauthorized copies, share ideas, and
speak freely, without the fear of being caught.
[104] Ad-hoc legislation is no longer sufficient to repair the decades-long
damage of traditional copyright’s functioning in the digital realm. Rescuing
democracy requires a reconstructive overhaul of digital copyright law. Fear that
creative works will no longer be created absent a monopoly-like incentive is
unfounded. Uncertainty about the future is no excuse for sanctioning legal
standards that force inferior technology and protect archaic power structures.
Empirical evidence demonstrates the social and economic benefits of publicly
distributed networks, and the law should be overhauled to encourage further
technological innovation. The ease with which information goods can be
replicated is inversely proportional to the cost of creating and distributing creative
works. Digital technology empowers market forces to pay for any real expenses
required for the creation of new works. One scholar keenly noted that it is better
to err on the side of public access and correct incentive problems later (if they
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appear).387 Once granted, it is harder to take a concession away from an industry
than it is to add a burden to users.388
[105] In economic theory, waste represents a cost to society incurred when
supply does not correlate to consumer demand. Publicly distributed networks
eliminate waste associated with the distribution of information goods. Networks
like the aptly named WASTE, a parasitic darknet capable of secretly
piggybacking on university or corporate networks389 and leeching their resources,
must also be eradicated. To do so, society must throw away the detritus of a
failing digital copyright regime and build a refurbished sanctuary for digital
democracy in its place.
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